End-state Afghanistan: A European Perspective. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 2, November 2009 by Coelmont, Jo.
 
 
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
#2 
November 2009 
End-State Afghanistan:  
A European Perspective 
Jo Coelmont 
 
 
When  in  2001  the  international  community 
launched  its  intervention  in  Afghanistan  it  could 
count  on  broad  political  support  and  the 
understanding of a large share of public opinion. 
Eight years later the initial optimist discourse has 
waned. Yet, defeatism,  as  it  emerged  a  few  years 
ago  with  regard  to  Iraq,  is  not w a r r a n t e d .  
Paradoxically the current situation, as bad as it may 
be,  also  contains  hope  for  the  better.  A  new 
approach, with more emphasis on the political and 
civilian  aspects,  is  not  just  vital  – i t  m a y  s t i l l  b e  
achievable.  
A  bottom-up  approach  addressing  separately  the 
many  dimensions  and  shortfalls  of  this  very 
complicated crisis management exercise will clearly 
be  insufficient  to  engender  the  kind  of  change 
required at present. The fundamental question to be 
addressed and answered is: how far are we down 
the  road  of  a  new  strategy,  shared  by  all  actors 
involved,  and  do  we  have  an  implementation 
mechanism  able  to  still  generate  success? 
Furthermore, how do we define success? 
Serenity 
A  limited  number  of  official  publications  do 
address these more strategic-level issues. However 
they  always  start  from  a  national  perspective 
emphasising  the  national  contribution  of 
participating countries and expecting other actors to 
fill  the  perceived  gaps.  This  shows  that  an 
international community which can actually count 
on the active contribution of a panoply of actors, is 
still unable to achieve unity of effort and constantly 
needs to generate requests for “more”. This results 
in  increasing  political  tension  between  the 
international community and the Afghan authorities 
as  well  as  tensions  within  the  international 
community  itself,  even  among  EU  countries  that 
jointly participate in operations or projects but now 
are looking for relief. This vicious circle must be 
broken. Unfortunately, a serene debate is hampered 
by  a  series  of  ambiguities  that  has  characterised 
crisis management in Afghanistan from the outset. 
The  international  conference  on 
Afghanistan called upon by Germany and 
the United Kingdom and to be held later 
this  year  or  in  early  2010,  will  probably 
offer  the  very  last  opportunity  for  the 
international community to turn the tide. 
It will also offer an ultimate opportunity 
for  the  EU  and  the  member  states  to 
develop a truly shared European view on a 
comprehensive  strategy  and potential 
contributions.  However,  our  actions  in 
Afghanistan can  only  be  part  of  a  more 
global  approach.  This  demonstrates  that 
also  the  EU  needs a  coherent  “Grand 
Strategy”. With the Lisbon Treaty we all 
signed up to this rather urgent objective. 
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Objectives and Means 
All  too  often  confusion  is  created  – w i l l i n g l y  o r  
unwillingly  – b e t w een  strategic  objectives  for 
Afghanistan  and  the  means  required  to  achieve 
them.  In  particular,  it  has  been  unclear  from  the 
beginning whether the US considered state-building 
and reconstruction as key objectives in their own 
right, or merely a condition to achieve success in its 
“Global War on Terror”. It allowed for all kinds of 
mission creep, produced confusion at the political 
level  and  generated  false  hope  among  the  local 
population.  This  probably  explains  why  a  sincere 
assessment  of  the  indeed  ambiguous,  but  at  the 
same time ambitious objectives versus the required 
means is rarely if ever made.  
At  present  the  Obama  Administration  is 
recalibrating  its  strategic  objectives  and  bringing 
more  clarity.  On  the  military  side  some  tough 
“lessons  identified”  about  counter-insurgency  and 
counter terrorism are now being studied. It is too 
soon to judge how and whether the revised military 
objectives will be met with the current and planned 
US troop reinforcements. On the other hand, it is 
clear  that  the  US  is  now g i v i n g  p r i o r i t y  t o  
Afghanistan,  embracing  the  political,  civilian  and 
military  aspects  of  the  crisis  and      planning  to 
generate  the  corresponding  additional  military 
resources.  But  we  can  also  observe  that  the 
participation of international partners in this debate 
and their influence on the strategic outcome remain 
rather limited. 
A  Two-Pronged  Approach  with  Separate 
Civilian and Military Tracks  
For  the  civilian  dimension,  initially  both  the 
definition and the implementation of a strategy for 
reconstruction had to a large extent been left to the 
Afghan  government,  with  an  international  donor 
conference providing the necessary finance1. Later 
on, attempts have been made by the international 
community  to  gain  more  grip  on  strategy  and 
implementation, however with limited success2. The 
                                                             
1 The Bonn Agreement, 5 December 2001.  
2 Tokyo  Conference ( 21-22 Jan. 2002), London Conference ( 31 
Jan.-1Feb.  2006),   T h e  I n t e r i m  A f g h a n i s t a n  N a t i o n a l  
Development Strategy  (I-ANDS – 2006) and The Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS – 2008) 
net result is far too limited. The  objective “to clear, 
hold and build”- the military clearing and holding, 
and civilian partners together with local authorities 
taking  care  of  the  rebuilding  - i s  f a r  f r o m  b e i n g  
reached. From previous operations we know that in 
such  a  scenario  the  military  runs  the  risk  of 
becoming  part  of  the  problem  rather  than 
contributing to the solution.  
For  the  civilian  aspects  as  well,  the  Obama 
Administration  has  revised  its  policy.  However, 
several  elements  still  remain  unclear  and  even 
worrying. In particular one could wonder whether 
the international community present in the field has 
reached  consensus  on  any  downscaled  or  revised 
civilian objective. Even if implicitly this would be 
the  case,  there  is s t i l l  n o  c l e a r  s i g n  o f  a n y  
comprehensive  process  generating  the  required 
means, not even for a modest level of ambition.  
NATO’s Involvement 
NATO finds itself in a rather exceptional situation. 
Not being involved in the initial military operations, 
it  now l e a d s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  c r i s i s  
management  effort,  the  International  Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), which has gradually come 
to cover the whole of the Afghan territory. Its task 
is  to  assist i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  safe  and  secure 
environment. However, the supporting political and 
civilian efforts - not a NATO responsibility- never 
fully materialized. The additional tasks subsequently 
assumed by NATO in the area of Security Sector 
Reform and civil-military assistance were and will - 
even with enhanced NATO recourses - inherently 
remain  insufficient  to  turn  the  tide.  As  to  the 
military  dimension, N A T O  i s  far  from  being  the 
only  actor  on  the  ground.  NATO’s  mission  is 
obviously only part  of  t he broader ef f ort s  of  t he 
international  community.  The  Alliance  cannot  be 
held responsible for the international efforts as a 
whole. Linking the future of NATO to the outcome 
of crisis management in Afghanistan, as argued by 
some, is not a constructive contribution to a serene 
debate.  
The EU and its Member States  
In  2001  Europe  immediately  voiced  its  solidarity 
with the US. But at the time the focus of the EU 
and  its  Member  States  was  on  the  widening  and 
deepening of the Union itself after the fall of the  
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Berlin  Wall.  The  military  dimension  of  crisis 
management  for  Afghanistan  was  only  discussed 
sideways in the EU.  
As to the civilian aspects, we can draw a parallel: the 
crisis  in  Yugoslavia  came  too  early  for  any 
significant  military  ESDP  response3;  the  one  in 
Afghanistan  to  soon  for a n y  s i g n i f i c a n t  c i v i l i a n  
ESDP  support.  Notwithstanding  the  remarkable 
progress recently achieved in the area of civil and 
civil-military operations4, the EU is still not able to 
generate capabilities at the level required to support 
an operation such as the one in Afghanistan5. 
Where  the  European  Commission  has 
supranational authority, various projects have been 
set up in Afghanistan. It expresses solidarity, in the 
same way as the Member States do. And indeed, the 
Member  States  showed  solidarity r i g h t  f r o m  the 
start by providing military, civil an financial support 
but  – w i t h  a  f e w  e x c e p t i o n s   such  as  the  UK  – 
remain absent from the strategic debate. Based on 
their own logic and priorities, governments set an 
upper  and  lower  limit  for  their  respective 
contributions, which differ widely, but are all based 
on  the  same  premise  of  doing  “the  minimum 
necessary”  to  maintain “ g o o d  r e l a t i o n s ”  with  the 
US.  Europe’s  absence  in  the  strategic  debate 
                                                             
3 Lessons drown from the inability of the EU to intervene with 
military means at the outbreak of the crisis in Yugoslavia (1991) 
led  to the 1998 French British bilateral summit at Saint-Malo 
which  defined  the  main  objectives  and  the  framework  of  the 
ESDP. At the Cologne European Council (1999), Member States 
signed up to these proposals.  
4 With the Headline Goal 2010 impressive conceptual work has 
been  done  in  recent  years  to  identify  the  civilian  capabilities 
required to support the all in all very moderate EU military level 
of ambition, notably of deploying at short notice a military force 
of  60,000 men supplemented by corresponding air and naval 
assets.  However,  it  remains  difficult  for  countries  to  commit 
themselves  to  provide  the  required  civilian  capabilities.  In 
contrast to the military, police officers , judges, experts in rule of 
law  and  civil  administration  are  focused  on  tasks  within  their 
respective  countries.  There  are  (as  yet)  no  EU-owned  civilian 
units or groups of experts, dedicated for immediate deployment 
in the event of an upcoming EU crisis management operation.     
5 Apart from the political aspects and the fact that the Union has 
to  support  a  series  of  ongoing  EU-civilian a n d  c i v i l -military 
operations, there is the additional difficulty that initially civilian 
ESDP capabilities have been developed to operate in a “safe and 
secure  environment”,  a  situation  that  has  seldom  or  never 
existed in Afghanistan. And in this respect, Afghanistan is not 
that exceptional a theatre. In order to cope with grey situations, 
called “pre-stability” or “fragile security”, the only option is to 
even  further  enhance  the  ongoing  civil-military  cooperation 
within the Union.   
impedes the development of a strategic vision on 
the deployment of its own assets. In this context, a 
comprehensive approach is all but impossible.  
To Conclude 
To put the crisis management on the right track it is 
now -more than ever- time to do away with all of 
the remaining ambiguities and ill-defined objectives. 
The  new  international  conference  called  upon  by 
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  on  6 
September, backed by France and to be held later 
this year or in early 2010, will probably offer the 
very  last  opportunity  for  the  international 
community  to  do  so  and  to  turn  the  tide  in 
Afghanistan.  It  will  also  offer  an  ultimate 
opportunity for the EU and the member states to 
develop a truly shared European view on strategy 
and implementation. Is Afghanistan and the wider 
region of importance or not? What is the desired 
end-state? 
The only hope for the better is for the conference 
to  generate  a  global  understanding  among  all 
relevant  actors  on  the  strategic  objectives,  on  a 
comprehensive  roadmap  and  finally,  on  a 
mechanism  to  generate  the  required  financial, 
civilian  and  military  means. A  c r e d i b l e  b u r d e n -
sharing can only be based on commonly identified 
strategic shortfalls. This is not a plea for “more”, 
but  above  all  for  “better”.  There  is  no  military 
solution, but neither is there at present a political 
solution  without  the  military  means.  These  can 
however only be successfully deployed if part of a 
truly comprehensive approach and above all, in the 
context  of  a  political  roadmap  which  involves  all 
regional  actors6.  Our  actions  in  Afghanistan  can 
only be part and parcel of a more global approach.  
 
In  turn,  this  demonstrates  that  the  EU  needs  a 
coherent  “Grand  Strategy”  about  the  values  it 
wants  to  protect  and  how  it  should  act  as  a 
responsible  actor  within  the  international 
community to empower these values. The European 
Security Strategy allows for hope in that direction, but 
hope is not a strategy. 
                                                             
6  See  hereafter;  “Crisis  management  Operations:  An  EU 
checklist”.  
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Crisis Management Operations: An EU Checklist 
During my tenure as permanent representative to the Military Committee of the EU (2002 -
2007), I could observe that throughout the planning process for a military or a civil-military 
operation the following principles and guidelines were always taken into account in order to 
safeguard chances for success: 
1. Absolute clarity of the military tasks and objectives to be achieved (thus avoiding mission 
creep as well as creation of false hope). 
2. Rules of engagement allowing the use of force whenever required to achieve the mission of 
the operation. 
3. Unity of command. 
4. Generation of sufficient forces for the objectives (which otherwise have to be adapted in 
function of the available forces, or deployment cancelled or postponed). 
5. Guaranteeing the security of one’s own forces. 
6. The availability of reserves able to cope with any worst-case scenario. 
7. Clear assignment of the non-military tasks to other partners present in theatre (who in turn 
have to go through a similar checklist). 
8. Clarity of the desired end-state, the ultimate objective (the military objective being only a 
means to that end). 
9. Support of public opinion at home and of the local population on the ground. 
10. Primus inter pares: a comprehensive political strategy. 
Compelling such a list is of course easy; fulfilling all of these conditions in real life is another matter. 
The complex crisis management for Afghanistan illustrates this. Yet the list is useful, as a tool to 
analyse what went wrong and how we can do better in the future. 
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